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Tailoring Partnersh IPS
for Success:
Experiences from the Djiboutian
Humanitarian Demining Program
This article examines the multiple partnerships that were formed during the
planning and training deployment of a team comprised of a sailor, Special
Operations Forces (SOF) soldiers, Marines, Department of State resourcers,
a civilian demining organization, and U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM)
planners. Several of the first-time partnerships discussed could be applicable
to future Humanitarian Demining (HD) programs. A fundamental lesson is
that the organizational parameters of selected U.S. government HD operations
require flexibility, and may need to be dismembered and recombined to
successfully accomplish a program's goals . Equally important, these
cooperative efforts resulted in significant cost savings to U.S. taxpayers
without degrading U.S. HD aid to Djibouti.

by Dr. Alan Childress and
Major Matt Zajac
Introduction
During j anuary 200 I, U.S. Mari nes,
Army SOF soldiers, and a Navy corpsman joined American Embassy personnel and a U.S. Srate Departmenr HD
contractOr (RONCO) to execute a U.S.
government-sponsored H D Program in
a Horn of Africa nation, D j ibouti. While
the commenceme nt of yet another U .S.
demining program in itself is not necessarily newsworthy, this particular operation enjoyed a few u nique aspects that
stemmed from experience and a spirit of
cooperation that e nabled the p layers to
bring fresh ideas ro the planning tabl e.
From irs inception rhe program entailed
the partnersh ip of the Department of
State Bureau of Political-Mi litary Affairs
Humani tarian Demining Program office
(PM/HOP ); A rmy SOF, Marine, and
Navy HD-related trainers; the civilian
demining communi ty; the Dj iboutian
government; the U.S. country ream in
Djibouti; and U.S. Central Command
planners. The success of the Dj ibouri H 0
program is due in large part to selfless
and accessible leadership and the convergence of military, governmen t, and civil-

ian secto r expertise. T he Djibouti HD
p rogram results suggest that "out of the
box" plan ning and execution cooperation
can achieve significant cost, schedule, and
quality-related consequences that open
H 0 programs to unforeseen advantages
(and pleasant surprises) .

The Mine Problem
Djibouti's mine problem is a result
of ten years of civil war. Due to the nature
of the warfare, the extent of the Djiboutian
land mine problem is unknown. However,
repeated mine incide nts involving both
military and civilian personnel, particularly
in the fertile norrhern regions of the country, had brought economic activity, developm ent, and non-govern mental relief operations to a near standstill. Mines/UXO
or the perception of the presence of mines/
UXO affects an estimated 45 percent of
Dj ibouti. While French forces stationed
within the country had provided some rudimentary military breaching trai ning to
a small Djiboutian military contingent,
Djibouti possessed neither the technical
nor organizational capabili ty to address irs
landmine problem. Consequently, in late
1999 Djibouti requested U.S. government
HD assistance.
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The U.S.-Djibouti Plan
Fol lowing U.S. government approval
for HD assistance, the American Embassy
in Djibouti, the D jiboutian government,
and USCENTCOM developed a one-year
HD cou n try plan for Djibou ti. The
Djibouti country plan outlined the U.S.
train-the-trainer strategy to assist Djibouri
in creating a self-sustain ing, civil ian -led
demin ing organization capable of reducing
the impact of the real or perceived landmine
threat in the near term and making the
nation mine-safe in the longer term. The
plan focused on creating a Djiboutian civilian steering committee and mine action
center organization, training and equipping
a mi litary mine survey and clearance unit,
developing a mine awareness and information management capabi lity, and energizing the donor community within the
country and mined regions to help sustain
the program. Previous HD country plans
were based on an 18-24 month planning
and execution cycle. Clearly, compressing
the length of rhe 18-24 month plan required the integration and cooperation of
both the Un ited States' and Djibouri's military, government and civilian capabilities.
T he program's planners could not visualize just how far the integration of these H 0
compone nt s wou ld advance in rh e
Dj ibouti program-and the development
of new partnerships is truly the success story
of this program.
T he Department of Defense normally
executes HD training programs with a standard package of Army SOF assets, which
consists of Special Forces, C ivil Affairs and
Psychological Operations teams, and generally aided by Army Explosive Ordinance
Disposal (EOD) personnel plus a logistics
cell. Due in part to a shortage of Special
Forces
asset s,
DoD,
through

USCENTCOM, tasked the First Marine
Expeditionary Force (I MEF) to lead the
training ream, in parr because I MEF was
familiar with Djibouti from conducting
previous and on going humanitarian assistance missions. Thus, in setti ng a DoD HD
precedent, a team ro train and assist
Djibouti establish a HD program was
formed by USCENTCOM and led by l
MEF. The team was comprised of Marine
engineers and EOD experrs, Army Special
Forces, C ivil Affairs, and Psychological
Operation trainers, and a Navy corpsman.
Each component brought unique skills ro
the team and, while some technical capabili ries overlapped, they provided a basis fo r
interesting exchanges and professional development opportunities for the Djiboutian
trainees as well as the U.S. trainers. In addition, integrating the experience of the
Special Forces team in training foreign soldiers ensured that cultural considerations
were practiced and misperceptions quickly
overcome. Not on ly did this unique conglomeration of fo rces succeed , it accomplished its cross-service planning and execution cycle within 12 months.

U.S. Be Djibouti Partnering
Military and civil ian government cooperation between the U.S. and Djibouti was
already strong. Previous and on going U.S.
humanitarian assistance programs, as well as
outstanding personal relationships between
the U.S. liaison officer and the Djiboutian
senior military and civilian leadership, had
developed an environment where frank assessments and solid commitmenrs to the program could be generated
during a shortened planningstage. The Djibourian
military agreed to provide a
dedicated
35-man Ethiopia
demining platoon led by a
superb, multilingual, highly
educated and selfless commander, Captain Youssouf,
an ex-French militaqcamp
to house a permanent mine
action center wirh bi lleting
and training facilities, and
various logistical support.
The Djiboutian military
obtained government approval to waive cusroms fees

and taxes on HD-related equipment and to
support import clearance ofmine/UXO destruction training devices. T he stage was set
for USCENTCOM components to conduct humanitarian demining training.

general, DOS PM/H OP contracts mine
clearance to industry, while DoD trains and
equips nations to demine d1emselves d1rough
train-the-trainer programs. Seldom have the
two approaches combined ro achieve rime
and cost savings.

Preparing for Training
Training the Training Team
The Djiboutianmilitary provided trainPrior to deployment, all U.S. trainers
ing and billeting facilities located at Camp
LeMonier. However, since these premises had attended the Humanitarian DeminingTraining Center (HDTC) at Fort Leonard Wood,
nor bee n occupied for so m e years,
USCENTCOM's requirements analysis sur- MO, where they received important lessons
vey team determined that renovation ofthese on not only the technical aspects of mine
facilities was necessary prior to inhabiting action bur critical, experience-based guidance
them. The spirit of cooperation of Depart- on the development of lesson plans, hostment of State PM/HDP to provide up front nation civil organ ization development and
funds and support to refurbish these facili- overcoming common training challenges. It
ties- before military training began- sig- was at HDTC that the face-to-face integranificantly reduced start-up time. This inrer- tion of this diverse, three-service military
agency (DOS and DoD) cooperation en- training ream really began. As an example of
abled facility renovation and training plan- the cooperation and integration between the
ning to occur simultaneously. M ilitary forces two groups, the HDTC D irector led a party
were not available to perform the renova- to Djibouti to collect lessons learned while
tions nor were they readily available to con- also contributing their expertise to the traintract and oversee the renovation project at ers at work.
Camp LeMon ier. PM/HDP's initial involvement was crucial to the ti mely start of the Djibouti Be U.S.
USCENTCOM HD program in Djibouti Relationships
and soon expanded from infrastrucrure and
T h e ac tu al tra in ing of th e
logistical support for trainer success, to susDjiboutian demining ream began in Febtainment support of the program as a whole.
In previous and current programs, DOS ruary and was completed in May 2001.
PM/HOP executes (outsources) thei r HD During this p eriod, two significant. part- ·
programs through a civilian contractor, nerships developed that contributed to
the program's success. One of these was
RONCO, while DoD's regional command,
USCENTCOM, execures irs HD programs p redictab le wh il e the other evo lved as
through military train-the-trainer programs, another "first" for USCENTCOM HD
independent of civilian trainertft..,..
support.
In
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was the development of mutual respect
and friendship between the U.S. trainers
and the members of the Djiboutian HD
ream. Although separated by an enormous cultural gap that span ned both personal and professional experiences, murual respen between individuals and
reams quickly developed. Many close
friendships and professional exchanges
conrinue today. While secondary to the
value we may place on people's safecy and
fr eedom, th e role of humanitarian
demining as an engagement opportunicy
was underscored in Djibouti.

Department of State
Logistics Support
The second unpredicred new partnership that evolved revolves around the success of PM/HDP's contractor, RONCO,
with renovating the facilities. Immediate results were gained from the RONCO
supervisor's knowledge of the local economy,
his language skills and his experience with
the business culture. Historically, local logistical support has generally been the responsibilicyof the Civil Affairs liaison officer. His
training in civil-military cooperation and language skills made him rhe def.1ult choice.
However, with the Civil Affairs liaison officer continuously tied up with daily logistical requirements, the U.S. team would lose
his skills in advising and coordinating the
integration of host nation civil authorities
and the non-governmemal support essential
to program sustainment. Recognizing this
misapplication of a scarce resource, the H D
Training Team commander requested that
PM/HOP continue supporting RONCO's
involvement as the HD Training Team's logistical contracting and disbursing officer. His
management of the day-ro-day logistical
needs, financial accounting, and his abilicy
to quickly effect facilicy repairs allowed the
HDTrainingTeam to focus on continuously
evaluating and improving training. Yer this
evolution of rhe USCENTCOM-DOSRONCO partnership still had one unforeseen, bur highly successfUl, permutation to
realize.

Sustainment Innovations
The final partnership developments,

and those most important to rhe HD
program's sustainment, were recognized
during rhe HD training and given urgency
as the USCENTCOM team prepared to
depart. The HDTraining leam had accomplished irs mission and the Djibourian military demining team proved their capabilities in a final, our-of-camp, week long training scenario designed to exercise independent planning, mine survey and clearance,
information management, local mine awareness and leadership skills. At the national
level, the Civil Affairs liaison officer had successfully integrated a national mine action
center into an exisringDjibourian cross-ministerial steering committee and obtained support from the U.S. Ambassador, the United
Nations Acting Resident Representative, and
other promi nenr non-governmental organizations acrive within the country. Yet the new
Djibomian HD organization (now formed
as the Djiboutian Mine Action Center or
DMAC) lacked planning and managerial
skills and critical mine action experience-both at the national and execution levels
where the military had been trained. The HD
Training Team's research into overcoming
these potentially debilitating wealmesses resulted in the reconfigurarion of and implementation of a new USCENTCOM-DOS
HD partnership.
Since one of the Country Plan's fUndamental goals was the establishment of a
self-sustaining, national mine action organization under a civilian-led steering committee, ir seemed logical that the American
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Embassy in Djibouti, as the DOS representative within the country, should assume
oversight of the HD program and its continued implemenration. However, prior to
the
Djiboutian
HD
program,
USCENTCOM had performed this fi.mcrion, usually through the U.S. Liaison Officer of the Defense Attache. The HD
Training Team recommended to rhe U.S.
Ambassador, whose ex perience with HD
progran1s in the region encompassed almost
a decade, ro assign responsibilicy for the continued oversight of the H D program to one
of his Country Team personnel-perhaps
the Political-Military Advisor. Obviously,
close cooperation berween the Embassy Political-M ilitary Advisor and the DoDUSCENTCOM Liaison Officer would be
necessary. Thus, while USCENTCOM
would conduct periodic assessment visits to
evaluate the Djiboutian military's evolving
capabilities and re-train if required, responsibilicy to assist rhe Djiboutian Government
in strengthening its civilian-led mine action
organization and to generate non-governmenral, long-term progran1 sustainment support rested with a CountryTeam civilian advisor. This arrangement recogn izes rhat
longer-term U.S. sustainment is a fUnction
of DOS funding, nor DoD, and in May
2001, the first DOS Embassy-based HD
program
manage r
attended
USCENTCOM's annual HD planning
conference in Tampa, FL.
Another
outcome
of
rhe
USCENTCOM and DOS-RONCO parr-

nership was the solution to providing onthe-ground experience and oversight ro the
newly trained Djiboutian military. Given
that RONCO's representative now had firsthand knowledge of rhe training provided to
rhe Djiboutian military and their land mine
problem, the HD Training Team recommended ro the Ambassador that parr of the
DOS sustainment money for 2001 be used
ro retain RONCO's services. RONCO's role
would then change from that of logistical
facilitator to an advisor to the Djibourian
Mine Action Center (DMAC). This would
provide several immediate benefits. First, a
civilian demining firm's employees would
nor be under the legal restrictions that prevent DoD personnel from entering known
mine-threatened areas. This would allow the
Djiboutian HD program to benefit from
current mine action experience at the location where demining is occurring. Second,
ir provides a direct link between the
Djiboutian military and the DOS representative in the American Embassy, strengthening the abilicy of DOS to influence the use
of USG provided resources. Finally, the
RONCO representative can provide accurate information regarding rhe
Dj ibourian programs development, enhancing USCENTCOM 's periodic training assessments.

Cost Reductions and
Increased Training and
Security Benefits
The results of completing infrastructure renovations at Camp LeMonier prior
to the arrival of U.S. trainers, and removing major burdens of logistical support
from the Country Team and the Civil Affairs officer can hardly be exaggerated.
When rhe trainers arrived in Djibouti their
billers were secure and ready for occupancy,
transportation vehicles were in place, offices and training facilities outfitted, and
messing areas complete. The savings in
hotel/villa billeting and transportation
costs were considerable and the en tire ream
was able to work and live in a secure environment. The Djibourian cadre were also
housed ar Camp LeMonier, which resulted
in training economies and relationship
building not achieved in previous
USCENTCOM HD operations. In addition, freeing rhe Civil Affairs officer from

logistical support details allowed him to
seek support from other agencies in teres ted
in helping the Djibourians and ro help rhe
government form a civilian-led HD organization. Finally, the costs associated with
four 7- 10 day visits to Djibouti by a warranted military contracting officer were
saved through PM/HDP'sconrractedsupporr. Again, this was a result of
USCENTCOM-PM/HDP parrnering in
rhe planning stages and a PM/HOP desk
officer volunteering to provide support,
through RONCO, in advance of training
start-up. Although breaking new ground
during this cooperative endeavor generated
several lessons learned, the experience and
results might serve as a model for future
HD engagemems in orher mine-inflicted
nations seeking U.S. assistance.

Shifting the Measures of
Effectiveness (MOE)
Paradigm
While nor directly related to rhe U.S.supporred Djibouti HD program, an additional lesson is raking shape from the
Djibouti experience. The authors note that
HD success has traditionally been measured
in quamiries such as numbers of mines and
UXO neutralized, minefields or area
cleared, and reduction in casualties. Donors
in particular often seek such numbers as
incentives to cominue support. A notion
being advanced today, in particular by the
UN, is that success may also be a fUnction
of socio-economic impact considerations
and people's perception of a mine threat.
Although Djibouti was nor recognized as a
high or even medium-threat mined nation,
roughly one-third of the northern region
was immobilized due to a perception of
mines and UXO. Exactly how much of that
perception is real icy may be determined by
the Djiboutian Mine Action Center as ir
broadens its operations; however, we predict that rhe presence of mine/UXO awareness and clearance teams will open the regions faster than exhibiting a number of
mines/UXO cleared. In fact, relatively few
mines may be found and still the areas will
have been opened to farming and commerce. Reduction in casualties remains the
most important consideration. Still, MOE
calculated from periodic reports of numbers of mines/UXO or minefields cleared
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will nor describe success in socioeconomic
factors such as people returned to their
homelands, increased productivity, and
opened agricultural areas. We would challenge Djibouti and other mine-affected
nations to gauge their mine threat successes
from a combined socioeconomic and casualcy reduction base.

Conclusion
The article examined rhe multiple parrnerships that were formed during the planning and execution of a demining program
by a relatively small ream of dedicated SOF
soldiers, marines, a sailor, and the benefits
achieved from USCENTCOM and DOS
cooperating and coordinating throughout
the program. Several of the partnerships discussed may be applied to orher HD programs. A fUndamental lesson is that the organizational parameters ofUSG HD operations must remain flexible, and indeed may
need ro be dismembered and recombined,
ro successfully meet a program's goals. Selfless and accessible leadership is a vital element in developing the inter-service relationships necessary to achieve these goals in a
compressed time span. The Djibourian Humanitarian Demining Training Team's flexible approach, and the unique partnerships
generated, resulted in categorical success and
provided unforeseen advantages to the U.S.
demining program in Djibouti. •
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